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Richard Sawyer in the preceding paper made two points of particular rel-evance to my comments. First he stated, in agreement with a broad spec-
trum of observers, that biotechnology provides perhaps our best opportunity 
for maintaining and increasing agricultural yields into the 21" century. Sec-
ond, he notes that public support for agricultural research is in decline, in 
places in steep decline, at virtually all levels from bilateral to local. Perhaps 
the hardest hit are the Consultative Group for Agricultural Research (CGIAR) 
centers with funding down about 35 percent over the past three years. In the 
U.S. we are relatively fortunate to have had our reductions in Federal funds 
largely limited to the controlled but relentless force of inflation; nominal allo-
cations have held constant while the real value sinks.
Clearly, something must be equating the promise with the reality, and that 
something is the private sector. This obvious deduction is readily supportable 
by the available data. Although figures vary, estimates are that the private sec-
tor provides three quarters of the funding for agricultural biotechnology, or 
roughly U.S. $900 million worldwide in 1985 (James 1991; Persley 1990). Nor 
is this research cheap. Private estimates are that over U.S. $20 million are 
needed for a single application of a transgenic crop (quoted in Altman 1994). 
A portion of that cost is regulatory approval with expenditures in the U.S. 
verging on U.S. $2 million per application. Other countries, including devel-
oping countries, need not consider that cost except to the degree they require 
or demand U.S. approval prior to consideration for national use.
Clearly, the private sector will require a return on this significant invest-
ment. About that there is nothing new. What is new is the self-reproducible 
nature of much of the technology, meaning that intellectual property rights 
protection (IPR) in the form of patents and Plant Breeders’ Rights (PBR) is 
an essential component in capturing a return. Second, the commercial life of 
many of these products may be short. They are commercially vulnerable to the 
breakdown of resistance in some cases and, for all, competition from new and 
improved products. A response to limited, temporal markets is the expansion 
of geographical markets. Taken together these mean that technology access for 
developing countries is going through a revolution of its own. More technology
is becoming available and overseas markets are being avidly sought. At the 
same time, much will be available only on a commercial basis and then only 
when the internal systems, notably IPR legislation, are satisfactory to the 
technology suppliers.
Such a scenario describes technological dependence, not interdepen-
dence. However, that ignores the key input into genetic engineering—the ge-
netic resources. Genetic resources, as has been well established, originate 
predominately from developing countries. Those resources until recently 
have been treated as the common heritage of humankind as was formally rec-
ognized in the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) publication Under-
taking for Plant Genetic Resources. The Convention on Biological Diversity 
forever altered that presumption by declaring genetic materials to be the sov-
ereign right of the government where they occur to exploit (Article 3). That 
is interdependence.
Countries have been utilizing that option, the best publicized being the 
agreement between Merck Research Laboratories in Rahway, New Jersey, USA 
and the Institute Nacional de Biodiversidad in Costa Rica, Central America 
(Merck/INBio), but there are others (Reid et al. 1993). Those agreements how-
ever are based on a contractual arrangement among the parties. Contracts are 
an effective mechanism for such agreements (see Simpson and Sedgo 1992), 
but are limited by placing no obligations on third parties. Anyone but the sig-
natories who acquire a product legally, such as purchasing a transgenic potato 
in a local market, may treat it as being public property. Contracts fundamen-
tally work from secrecy, and secrecy is neither generally possible nor really ap-
propriate for agriculture (see Lesser 1994).
What then appears to be the situation is the interdependent parties are 
willing to pay each other, but lack a mechanism. The juxtaposition in the 
Biodiversity Convention of the articles treating the commercialization of ge-
netic resources (Article 15) and the acquisition of technologies (particularly 
biotechnologies) (Article 16) could suggest a barter arrangement using the 
two. Barter implies a direct exchange of equal value without the use of 
money. However, barter is an extremely complex exchange arrangement, es-
pecially as regards enforcement of the conditions. The appropriate mecha-
nism is intellectual property rights, but my position is that they are at present 
inadequate in most developing countries for acquiring biotechnologies and 
essentially nonexistent everywhere for claiming remuneration for genetic 
materials.
OBJECTIVE
What exists then in my view is a global interdependence lacking a facilitating 
mechanism. A portion of this, and that portion to be addressed here, is the 
apparent position by many developing countries that IPR on balance do not 
serve national interests, nor do they provide equity in either its moral or prac-
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tical sense. The purpose of this paper is to set forth in outline my assessment 
of what is needed to structure an international system of rights which recog-
nizes and responds to this interdependence. That assessment will by necessity 
consider both developed to developing, and developing to developed, country 
exchanges, referred to here as North-South (N-S) and South-North (S-N) ex-
changes. We begin with N-S transfers.
My institution, ISAAA, the International Service for the Acquisition of 
Agri-biotech Applications, facilitates such transfers and is the source of sev-
eral examples; ABSP (Agricultural Biotechnology for Sustainable Productiv-
ity) among other groups could provide additional examples. The examples 
are the transfer of virus resistance (PVX and PVT) using a Monsanto technol-
ogy into Mexican potato varieties, and the transfer of papaya ringspot virus 
resistance, a Cornell University technology, to several countries including 
Brazil and Thailand.
NORTH-SOUTH TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
Geographical  Scope  of  IPR Protection
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) protection is national, meaning that it ap-
plies only in those countries where protection is held. As of 1990, 63 coun-
tries explicitly excluded patents for plants, about half of which are developing 
countries (WIPO 1990). The situation for animals is slightly more restrictive. 
The ban on plants is not as complete in all these countries as might appear to 
be the case because the prohibition reads to “plant varieties,” not plants per se. 
This has allowed the European Union (EU) to state the option of defining “va-
riety” narrowly and to grant patents for plants not in a “fixed form” (see Crespi 
1992). Potentially, any other countries using similar exclusionary language 
could act similarly. At minimum the protection situation is complicated.
Plant Breeders’ Rights (PBR) legislation is similarly limited in geographic 
scope with only 23 countries and but one developing country (South Africa) 
signatory in April 1993 to the International Union for the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants (UPOV), the international convention. Several countries 
have national laws—including Argentina, Chile and Zimbabwe—but the par-
ticulars are difficult to come by. Thus, presently, the geographic scope of IPR 
as applicable to biotechnology applications in living organisms is very limited.
Some of this will change under the recently adopted text of the Uruguay 
Round of the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which over 
one hundred countries, some 70 of which are developing countries, have signed. 
One aspect of the agreement, known as Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs) requires all countries within a five to ten-year period 
to provide the following forms of protection (MTN/FA II-A1C):
• Contracting parties shall provide for the protection of plant varieties 
by patents and/or an effective situ generous (meaning separate law like 
UPOV) system (Section 5, Article 27[3b]).
• Plants and animals other than microorganisms and “essentially bio-
logical processes for the production of plants and animals” may be excluded 
from protection (Section 5, Article 27 [3b]).
• Patents maybe prohibited to protect order public or morality, pro-
vided there is a justification exceeding the mere prohibition in domestic law 
(Section 5, Article 27[2]).
Other stipulations exist, but lie further outside our scope. In my judgment, 
these requirements even when fully implemented will leave gaps in coverage 
which might be of significance for agricultural biotechnology applications.
It is quite evident that countries may exclude plants and animals from patent 
protection by choice. Even the terminological issues discussed above regard-
ing the exclusions in the EU would seem not to apply. In the EU, as noted 
above, the legislation refers to varieties whereas under TRIPs, reference is 
made to plants and animals. The public morality provision is a further delim-
iter if desired. Countries can be expected to adopt PBR; indeed India is pres-
ently in the process. However, PBR does not protect an engineered gene which 
can be transferred to another variety by backcrossing. Thus PBR alone may be 
considered by some owners of genetic technologies as being insufficient. More 
encompassing laws, however, will come only when countries, and in particular 
developing countries, consider it in their advantage to pass such laws.
ROLES OF IPR IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
The principal justification of IPR is as an incentive for private investment 
(e.g., Machlup 1958). Evidence of its effects, while by no means complete, is 
generally supportive of that expectation for the industrialized countries. For 
the developing countries the issue is somewhat different, as legitimate ques-
tions have been raised about their competitive position as producers of world 
class technologies. I personally believe that matter can be answered in the 
positive (see literature review in Lesser 1991, Chap. 4), but the issue to be 
addressed here is not production but access. What role does IPR play in 
the willingness of private firms to make available easily copied technologies 
like plants?
About that we have little specific evidence primarily because the subject 
is only now arising with potentially very valuable agricultural biotechnolo-
gies nearing the commercialization stage. Moreover it is not clear that the 
major proprietary suppliers have a clear policy, probably because there are 
larger markets to be considered first. Offers have, I understand, been made 
(e.g., to India) to give blanket rights for an upfront fee described as ten cents 
on the dollar. Yet few countries are willing or financially able to enter such a 
deal. Among its unattractive aspects is the shifting of product performance 
risk to the user.
Similarly, many countries are hesitant to allow protection, which implies 
the payment of royalties for what can in all probability be acquired free once
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marketed. Presumably a similar recognition led the investor to offer (unsuc-
cessfully) blanket rights at a large discount. Yet acquisition in that manner, 
even when legal, involves a time cost. Backcrossing Bacillus thurengiensis (Bt) 
genes into a locally adapted cotton variety takes about four years, four more 
years of heavy pesticide applications, followed by the biosafety review. And 
then the seeds must be propagated for wide use. What should developing coun-
tries be doing? ISAAA, which must eventually assist in identifying a response, 
has no real answer.
There is another class of IPR issues which poses even less clear issues. It 
can be typified by the DuPont Corporation, Wilmington, DE, USA “gene 
gun” case. Where the gene gun is patented, I understand, DuPont (operating 
through its licensee Agracetus Inc., Middleton, Wisconsin, USA) requires 
rights to resultant products as a condition for a license. Where the gene gun 
is not patented (e.g., in Brazil) it is said to be manufactured at a significant 
level which is perfectly legal. But what are the possible costs to Brazil? Is there 
a moral obligation? Can it legitimately be argued that there is no moral obli-
gation to private companies or to “rich” multinationals? Can the products 
be imported into countries (like members of the European Patent Union) where 
direct and indirect products of patented technologies cannot be sold without 
permission? Probably not. What will happen if in the future Brazilian scien-
tists seek other technologies directly from DuPont or from other private firms? 
Will/can DuPont hold a commercial grudge? Should this concern Brazil? How 
will the World Bank and other bi/multilateral donors respond, as much project 
funding will, directly or indirectly, be coming from those sources?
Possible  Action
In order to meet their GATT/TRIPs commitments, some 70 developing coun-
tries will over the coming several years be modifying their IPR systems sub-
stantially. Concurrently, many new agricultural biotechnology applications 
are expected to become available. This is the proper time to consider the ap-
propriate forms of those laws. The format can be similar to the assistance 
which ISAAA, ABSP, SEI (Stockholm Environment Institute, Sweden), the 
Dutch Government and other groups have provided for biosafety regulations.
To me what is lacking is a clear concept of the program content. This is 
primarily because the ultimate issue is between countries and the private sec-
tor, and secondarily between countries and university licensing groups. Thus 
I am calling on private interests to develop positions and share those positions 
with developing countries. Clearly the private sector has expectations of what 
developing countries should do; those expectations must be both clear and 
realistic. Many in the public sector, including ISAAA, can help with the deliv-
ery of those positions, but we cannot generate them. At the same time it is ap-
propriate to begin thinking about ways to simplify access to materials. Present 
trends suggest a not-distant future when any technology may have multiple 
claimants making the process of identifying the owners and negotiating with
them onerous. Consider the papaya ring spot virus technology ISAAA is 
brokering. Aspects are potentially claimable by Upjohn Company in Kalama-
zoo, Michigan, USA, Cornell University and DuPont, and this is only the be-
ginning. True, this already occurs for other technologies, but those technolo-
gies are generally not directed to multiple users in scores of countries. Some 
kind of simplification, possibly including a clearinghouse agency or prestated 
royalty rate structure for many of the more minor innovations, is needed.
SOUTH-NORTH TRANSFERS
As noted, this form of exchange is presumed to include the utilization of ge-
netic materials for agricultural developments and other uses. For simplicity, 
materials currently held ex situ will not be discussed because their legal status 
is unclear; the Biodiversity Convention (Article 15 [c] [3])makes special note 
of its applicability to materials acquired before it went into effect in Decem-
ber 1993.
In an earlier effort I attempted to characterize the limited protection for 
genetic materials under existing laws (Lesser 1994). That evaluation covered 
not only patents and Plant Breeders’ Rights, but also possible extensions through 
Codes of Conduct and (proposed but not enacted) folklore rights. All were 
found lacking in providing meaningful protection, protection leading to pos-
sible collection of royalties. The principal confounding issue is the identifica-
tion of just what is being protected. An absence of a clear delineation creates 
broad ambiguity over who is claiming what. That in turn interferes with re-
search access and creates the likelihood of conflict among countries (presuming 
they are the titleholders) with identical or similar protected materials. Tech-
nical solutions have been proposed, but they are costly for materials—the 
bulk of which will have little commercial value.
The current course of legal activity is along the lines of access laws. Many 
countries have these for pharmaceutical purposes while others (e.g., Queens-
land, Australia and, I believe, Brazil) are adopting them for all product access. 
Some legal stipulation is required if countries are to prevent someone from 
simply carrying off materials as in most cases they presently have full legal 
rights to do. Access laws are a means of implementing the “sovereign rights” 
to genetic materials specified under the Biodiversity Convention (Article 3). 
Indeed, modes and modalities for legislation will be discussed at the first 
Meeting of the Parties of the Biodiversity Convention in late 1994.
For me, the discussion of particular text is premature because objectives 
remain unclarified. They are often proposed in terms of equity, but equity has 
many aspects. One form is equity for past contributions, the multigenerational 
selection needed in the creation of a landrace, for example. Another form in-
volves payments for future contributions, whether for research and develop-
ment leading to new useful products or for conservation activities. Either or 
both to some degree are possible and justifiable, but the matter must be dis-
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cussed forthrightly, or at least identified. For myself, I see the additional ben-
efits to humanity of payments for future contributions.
A second major question is the functioning of the laws. Major IPR laws 
operate through exclusion, the right to refuse access. Indeed, that is really the 
only benefit they provide. Some countries, however, allow so-called licenses- 
of-right, blanket compulsory licenses for everyone meeting the requirements, 
(e.g., the payment of a royalty). Compulsory licenses remain an anathema to 
many supporters of IPR, but to me they are the only reasonable solution for the 
mass of materials likely to be protected under these new systems. Licenses of 
right emphasize access which is critical for agricultural applications. At the 
same time a streamlined system will be less costly to operate, returning more 
to the owners by absorbing less in transactions costs.
Possible  Actions
Steps are being taken for the preparation and subsequent adoption of legisla-
tion controlling access to genetic resources. While those laws might be justi-
fied largely by the understandable desire to collect payments from private firms, 
they will also affect access for research and other uses. For that reason it is 
critical that a broader group becomes knowledgeable about and involved in 
the process. A change of venue is also desirable. Presently, much will be con-
ducted within the auspices of the Biodiversity Convention which, while ap-
pealing at one level, is not really appropriate with its 300+ delegates for the 
consideration of such a detailed topic.
CONCLUSIONS
With biotechnology now near to having numerous applications in developing 
countries, it is abundantly clear that little of that technology will be available 
without charge. Developing countries need those materials and must pay for 
what is used. At the same time, and in partial response, developing countries 
are seeking payment for their own genetic materials, these in the form of largely 
unimproved germplasm. In many regards, placing access on a cash basis facili-
tates the process, since at least what is being requested can be readily under-
stood and negotiated.
However, we do not presently have a real market for these materials/tech- 
nologies, a market which operates efficiently as do markets for major agricul-
tural commodities. Inefficient markets absorb much of the value of the prod-
ucts exchanged, value which should go to the owners. Principal limitations, 
in my viewpoint, are: 1. the weakness/lack of Intellectual Property Rights in 
many recipient countries and 2. the virtual absence of laws controlling access 
to genetic materials. We are all dependent on the outcome of the process of 
rectifying those gaps; it is time that more of us become knowledgeable about 
and involved in the process of filling them.
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